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I
INTRODUCTION
Several articles in this symposium, including Thomas Brudholm’s and
Valérie Rosoux’s The Unforgiving: Reflections on the Resistance to Forgiveness
After Atrocities,1 explore challenges to the ability of communities to reconcile in
the aftermath of mass violence. One theme that emerges from this collection is
the importance of scrutinizing assumptions that drive political and legal
responses to large-scale violence. Drawing on prior work regarding transitional
justice, this comment explores how assumptions about justice have succeeded in
establishing a new international consensus on necessary processes of rebuilding
societies, some pitfalls of this approach, and recommendations for new
directions for the field of transitional justice.
II
ASSUMPTIONS
A central assumption animating the moral, political, and legal cases for
transitional justice is that those responsible for unleashing and conducting mass
violence that devastates countries and the lives of civilian residents should not
“get away with” their criminal acts.2 And further, supporters of justice assume
that a legal response is necessary in order to promote reconciliation.3 However,
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1. Thomas Brudholm & Valérie Rosoux, The Unforgiving: Reflections on the Resistance to
Forgiveness After Atrocity, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (Spring 2009).
2. See Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein, Introduction: Conflict, Justice, and Reclamation, in MY
NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 4–5
(Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004) [hereinafter MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY].
3. Laurel E. Fletcher, From Indifference to Engagement: Bystanders and International Criminal
Justice, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1013, 1018–21 (2005).
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until quite recently, legal impunity and social amnesia were more the rule than
the exception. New governments that assumed power after cataclysmic violence
operated under political and legal restraints in which amnesty for past crimes
helped to purchase peace agreements.4 The end of the Cold War, public outrage
over the wars in the Balkans, and genocide in Rwanda spurred the United
Nations to act and helped turn the tide against wrongdoers. This momentum
culminated in the establishment of the International Criminal Court.5
This era also witnessed the birth of the South Africa Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (SATRC). The innovative framework of the
SATRC, which conditioned amnesty on full disclosure of criminal acts, quieted
critics of truth commissions and ushered in new international acceptance among
international-justice advocates that truth-seeking mechanisms were valid
alternatives to criminal trials.6 Transitional-justice advocates for criminal trials
and truth commissions justify these mechanisms as capable and necessary to
escort a country from a violent past to a peaceful future.7 The success of their
efforts has paid off. The landscape of acceptable options for addressing past
episodes of mass violence or authoritarian regimes has been indelibly altered.
The international presumption prevails that something must be done by states
(alone or through the international community) to address the past. Debate
centers on the contours of the appropriate mechanisms.8
III
PITFALLS
The assumption that justice for past periods of violence and repression
promotes reconciliation has been the midwife of two ad hoc criminal tribunals,
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and of initiating transitional-justice
mechanisms in Liberia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Cambodia, and Morocco—all
since 1993.9 Yet there are warning signs that these institutions may not be able
to achieve the lofty goals of supporters. In fact, the design and implementation
of transitional-justice programs may have unintended consequences that

4. See TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER
REGIMES, at xxi–xxii (Neil Kritz ed., 1995) (a three-volume collection of works that explores the
philosophical, moral, political, and legal debates regarding transitional justice, including a volume of
twenty-one case studies; questions raised by criminal prosecutions, including the use of amnesties are
addressed in multiple selections).
5. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1015.
6. Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein et al., Stay the Hand of Justice: Whose Priorities
Take Priority?, in LOCALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: JUSTICE INTERVENTIONS AND LOCAL
PRIORITIES AFTER MASS VIOLENCE (Rosalind Shaw et al. eds., forthcoming 2009).
7. See Stover & Weinstein, supra note 2, at 3–5 (publication of empirical research conducted in
the Balkans and Rwanda examining the relationship between international criminal justice and
communities affected by mass violence).
8. Fletcher & Weinstein et al., supra note 6.
9. See generally Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Context, Timing and the Dynamics of
Transitional Justice: A Historical Perspective, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 163 (2009).

04_FLETCHER_CONTRACT PROOF.DOC

Spring 2009]

INSTITUTIONS FROM ABOVE AND VOICES FROM BELOW

8/27/2009 10:08:36 AM

53

frustrate or even exacerbate the struggles of communities emerging from mass
violence or from a period of repression.
Advocates for trials or truth commissions invoke “reconciliation” as the
destination to which these initiatives will lead. However, it is not clear how the
term applies or whether it is even usefully employed in the context of group
violence or repression.10 Transitional justice appears to share the phenomenon
that Susan Bandes describes in this symposium: an untested, unreflective
application of concepts appropriate to a therapeutic context for legal and policy
prescriptions.11 One individual may forgive another for a transgression, but what
does it mean for communities to reconcile? Rather, the term social
reconstruction better frames the structural, institutional, and policy reforms
needed to generate the conditions under which individual-to-individual
reckoning may occur.12 In other words, it may make sense to understand trials
and truth commissions as helping to generate official histories about the past,
acknowledge the loss of victims, remonstrate perpetrators, and instantiate a
state commitment to rule of law and to nonviolent conflict resolution that will
help lay the groundwork for former enemies to leave aside past grievances and
work together to rebuild.
Even with this reframing of the goal, it is far from clear that trials and truth
commissions are capable of delivering on this promise. James L. Gibson’s
empirical work on the SATRC in this symposium13 adds to the small but
growing body of scholarship studying the impact of transitional-justice
mechanisms. The empirical evidence gives us a far richer understanding of the
contextual complexities in which transitional justice plays out. Support for statesanctioned reckoning among communities varies in unexpected ways.
Communities may be split regarding their readiness to live with former
enemies, their support for trials, or even whether they believe that
accountability of any sort is acceptable.14
Similarly, reports in countries like East Timor and Sierra Leone have
documented civil society’s discontent with those countries’ truth commissions

10. See Stover & Weinstein, supra note 2, at 13–14.
11. See Susan A. Bandes, Victims, “Closure,” and the Sociology of Emotion, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (Spring 2009); see also Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social
Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573, 592–95 (2002)
(critiquing the argument that criminal trials for mass violence promote therapeutic healing for
individual victims).
12. Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 11, at 623–35.
13. James L. Gibson, On Legitimacy Theory and the Effectiveness of Truth Commissions, 72 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (Spring 2009).
14. Eric Stover & Harvey Weinstein, Conclusion: A Common Objective, A Universe of
Alternatives, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 2, at 332–36; INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY,
FORGOTTEN VOICES: A POPULATION-BASED SURVEY ON ATTITUDES ABOUT PEACE AND JUSTICE
IN NORTHERN UGANDA 28–29 (2005).
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and courts.15 Justice mechanisms are perceived by some as disconnected from
the local institutions and community priorities.16
Part of this gap between assumptions underlying transitional-justice
mechanisms and their effects on the intended beneficiaries of these institutions
can be traced to the fact that communities do not speak with a single voice.
“Justice” means many things to many survivors: for some it may be criminal
trials of political leaders, for others punishment of their neighbor who killed a
family member is most important, and some may find justice in being able to
return to one’s home and live in peace.17 Complicating matters further is the
observation that individual and community priorities change over time.18
IV
RECOMMENDATIONS
How are transitional-justice mechanisms to promote social reconstruction if
the priorities for what measures are needed vary within communities and
change over time? There are no easy answers, but the available record suggests
the need for a new approach. First, transitional-justice adherents need to
reexamine the assumption that communities emerging from mass violence or
repression are assisted by criminal trials or truth commissions. Empirical data
should be gathered regarding community desires as to the relative importance
of trials, commissions of inquiry, or other means of reckoning with the past.19
And data collection should be conceived of as an ongoing part of planning and
implementing transitional-justice programs. There are hard trade-offs
involved—how should we resolve conflicts when some affected groups want
criminal punishment for perpetrators in order to move forward and others feel
that only through forgiving perpetrators will the community recover?20 Meir
Dan-Cohen’s article in this symposium offers the possibility of shifting
“temporal boundaries” around past events as part of moving beyond a
collective injury.21 However, the means for redrawing these boundaries are
contested and require a dynamic analysis informed by the voices of community
members.
Second, in those instances in which the international community becomes
involved in establishing and implementing transitional-justice institutions, more
attention should be given to the interface between the international and
national. Repeated instances of well-intentioned international efforts to
promote transitional justice have alienated critical segments of the national
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See Fletcher & Weinstein et al., supra note 6.
Id.
See Stover & Weinstein, supra note 2, at 10–13.
See Fletcher & Weinstein et al., supra note 6.
Id.
Id.
Meir Dan-Cohen, Skirmishes on the Temporal Boundaries of States, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 95 (Spring 2009).
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population: judges, lawyers, and civil society. Perceptions within countries of
top-down approaches by the international community generate frustrations and
distort institutional relationships and power dynamics, which undermines the
legitimacy of international efforts.22
Finally, it is time to consider timing and sequencing of transitional-justice
initiatives. The trend toward earlier and earlier establishment of trials or truth
commissions may mean that in the rush to justice, we have missed the mark.
The conditions under which trials or truth commissions will promote social
reconstruction will be influenced by a number of factors, including culture, legal
structure, strength of rule of law, and economic development.23 More work
needs to be done to understand how efforts to prosecute wrongdoers, to
promote public disclosure, and to acknowledge crimes and misdeeds might
unfold within the historical context, and how that particular context might
influence transitional-justice measures.24 In other words, there may be a time
when redrawing the temporal boundaries of the state will successfully shift an
incident from collective memory to history. Currently, however, no empirical or
theoretical data indicate when that moment arises or how intervention might
hasten its arrival. Nevertheless, we must begin to grapple with this
indeterminacy by refraining from unalloyed promotion of transitional justice
and by reexamining some of the foundational assumptions of the field.25

22. Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, A World unto Itself? The Application of
International Justice in the Former Yugoslavia, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 2, at 29–48.
23. See Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 9.
24. Id.
25. Id.

